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Abstract—The integration of intelligent reflecting surface (IRS)
and multiple access provides a promising solution to improved
coverage and massive connections at low cost. However, securing
IRS-aided networks remains a challenge since the potential
eavesdropper also has access to an additional IRS reflection
link, especially when the eavesdropping channel state information
is unknown. In this paper, we propose an IRS-assisted non-
orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) scheme to achieve secure
communication via artificial jamming, where the multi-antenna
base station sends the NOMA and jamming signals together to
the legitimate users with the assistance of IRS, in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. The sum rate of legitimate users
is maximized by optimizing the transmit beamforming, the
jamming vector and the IRS reflecting vector, satisfying the
quality of service requirement, the IRS reflecting constraint and
the successive interference cancellation (SIC) decoding condition.
In addition, the received jamming power is adapted at the highest
level at all legitimate users for successful cancellation via SIC. To
tackle this non-convex optimization problem, we first decompose
it into two subproblems, and then each subproblem is converted
into a convex one using successive convex approximation. An
alternate optimization algorithm is proposed to solve them
iteratively. Numerical results show that the secure transmission in
the proposed IRS-NOMA scheme can be effectively guaranteed
with the assistance of artificial jamming.
Index Terms—Artificial jamming, beamforming optimization,
intelligent reflecting surface, non-orthogonal multiple access,
physical layer security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) is a promising tech-
nique to improve communication quality via reconfiguration
of propagation environment [2]. As a two-dimensional sur-
face consisting of a large number of passive reconfigurable
reflecting units, IRS can be flexibly deployed on the facade
of buildings. Compared with traditional relays, IRS consumes
less power because it only reflects signals by using low-cost
reflecting elements [3], [4]. On the other hand, due to its
flexible reconfigurability of IRS, it can easily work in the full-
duplex mode without involving interference [5]. Therefore,
IRS has drawn tremendous attention from both academia and
industry recently [6].
IRS has a great potential to enhance physical layer security
(PLS) for wireless networks [7]–[11], as the reflected signal
can be beamformed at legitimate receivers and suppressed
at the eavesdropper by adjusting IRS reflecting elements. In
[7], Chen et al. proposed a programmable secure wireless
environment using this reconfiguration capability of IRS. Thus,
there is no need to deploy extra relay or jammer to degrade
the reception at the eavesdropper, which greatly reduces the
transmission power. In [8], the achievable secrecy rate of
an IRS-assisted system was maximized by Guan et al. via
jointly optimizing the precoding with artificial noise and IRS
beamforming. The exceptional performance of IRS in secure
transmission has been utilized in both multi-input single-
output (MISO) and multi-input multi-output (MIMO) systems
[9], [10]. Furthermore, the secure communication of IRS-
MISO systems was investigated in [11] by Yu et al., taking
into account the imperfect channel state information (CSI) of
eavesdropping channels. However, all these works are based
on the assumption that the full CSI or partial CSI of the
eavesdropper is available in legitimate networks [7]–[11],
which is challenging in practice since the eavesdropper is
usually passive and does not actively exchange its CSI with
the transmitter.
On the other hand, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA)
is considered as an effective solution to enhancing spectrum ef-
ficiency and achieving massive connectivity in future wireless
networks [12], [13]. Different from the conventional orthogo-
nal multiple access (OMA), the power-domain NOMA allows
the allocation of the resource block (i.e., frequence/code) to
multiple users simultaneously [14]. At the transmitter, the
signals for different users use different power levels according
to the difference in channel gain, and then superimposed in
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the power domain. At the receiver, successive interference
cancellation (SIC) is utilized to eliminate the multiple-access
interference and decode the desired information [15]. Due to
its concurrent communications nature, NOMA systems are
susceptible to different security and confidentiality related
issues. To guarantee the secure transmission in NOMA net-
works, various PLS methods have been proposed, e.g., beam-
forming [16]–[18], cooperative relaying [19], [20], artificial
jamming [21], [22], etc.
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that NOMA can achieve
better spectrum efficiency than OMA only when the channel
gains of the users are considerably different. Since IRS can
digitally adjust the phase shift of reflected signals, it has a
great potential to enhance the channel difference and obtain
the NOMA gain in various scenarios. Due to the advan-
tages of IRS and NOMA, these two techniques have been
combined recently [23]–[26]. In [23], Mu et al. considered
a joint active and passive beamforming design problem to
maximize the sum rate in IRS-aided NOMA networks. The
downlink communication of IRS-assisted NOMA systems
was investigated by Zuo et al. [24], in which the system
throughput was maximized by jointly optimizing the channel
assignment, SIC decoding order, power allocation, and IRS
coefficients. In [25], Ding et al. proposed a design of IRS-
assisted NOMA to guarantee the service of cell-edge users by
applying IRS to align the cell-edge users channel vectors. As a
further advance, an IRS enhanced millimeter-wave (mmWave)
NOMA system was considered in [26], which confirms that
by introducing IRS, the coverage of mmWave-NOMA systems
has a significant improvement, especially when there are no
direct links between the base station (BS) and users.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the security aspect
of IRS-assisted NOMA networks has not been investigated.
Different from NOMA, introducing IRS provides an additional
reflection link that may enhance the signals received by the
potential eavesdropper, especially when the eavesdropping CSI
is unknown. Thus, this will be a double-edged sword for
the secure transmission. Motivated by the aforementioned
discussion, in this paper, we propose an artificial jamming
aided IRS-NOMA scheme, in which the jamming signal is
generated with NOMA information to disrupt the potential
eavesdropping. The contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, research on the security of
IRS-assisted NOMA networks has not been done. Thus,
the first contribution of this paper is the proposal of an ar-
tificial jamming aided IRS-NOMA scheme, which could
maximize the legitimate sum rate while guaranteeing the
security via artificial jamming.
• In the proposed scheme, the artificial jamming is gen-
erated together with the NOMA information, which can
suppress the eavesdropping efficiently. At legitimate re-
ceivers, the jamming signal can be completely eliminated
via SIC with the help of the transmit beamforming and
IRS reflecting optimization.
• Due to the non-convexity of the proposed optimization
problem, it is first decomposed into two subproblems,















Fig. 1. Artificial jamming assisted IRS-NOMA network with multiple users
and one passive eavesdropper.
fixed IRS reflecting vector and vice versa. Then, these
two subproblems are approximated into convex ones via
successive convex approximation (SCA) and the original
problem can be solved effectively by an iterative algo-
rithm based on alternating optimization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the system model. The optimization problem
is formulated in Section III. In Section IV, the formulated
problem is first decomposed into two subproblems, and then
an algorithm is proposed to solve them iteratively. In Section
V, simulation results are presented, followed by conclusions
in Section VI.
Notation: CM×N is the space of complex matrices. Ra×b
is the a× b-dimensional real matrix. IN is the N ×N identity
matrix. aH and diag(a) denote the conjugate transpose and the
diagonal matrix of a, respectively. CN (n,N) is the complex
Gaussian distribution with mean matrix n and covariance
matrix N. A ≽ 0 denotes that A is a Hermitian positive
semidefinite matrix. ▽x denotes the gradient of the variable
x, and Re(·) is the real operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider the secure communication
from a M -antenna BS to K single-antenna NOMA users in
the presence of one passive eavesdropper, where an IRS is
deployed on the facade of a surrounding building to strengthen
the desired signal. The direct path between the BS and mobile
users is blocked due to unfavorable propagation conditions.
The kth user Uk, k ∈ K has a fixed location (xk, yk, 0) on
the ground, where K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. The CSI of all the
legitimate channels is assumed to be perfectly known by the
BS as it can be efficiently obtained via the recent advances in
channel estimation for IRS [27], [28].
Assume that a potential eavesdropper exists to collect the
confidential information of legitimate users, with its CSI
unavailable for the legitimate network due to its passive
characteristic. To disrupt the eavesdropping and guarantee the
secure transmission of legitimate users, the artificial jamming
is generated together with NOMA information at the BS. The
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wksk + wjamz, (1)
where wk ∈ CM×1 denotes the precoding vector for user
k, with ∥wk∥2 = Pk, sk is the NOMA information of Uk
satisfying |sk|2 = 1, wjam ∈ CM×1 represents the artificial
jamming vector with ∥wjam∥2 = Pjam, and z denotes the
jamming signal satisfying |z|2 = 1.
The received signal at the kth user can be given by
yk = hr,kΦHmx + nk, k ∈ K, (2)
where nk ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at Uk with mean zero and variance σ2. Φ =
diag
(
ejθ1 , ejθ2 , . . . , ejθN
)
∈ CN×N represents the diagonal
phase-shifting matrix by all IRS reflecting elements, where N
denotes the number of elements on the IRS. θn ∈ [0, 2π) is
the phase shift on the combined incident signal by its n-th
element, ∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N . Hm ∈ CN×M denotes the Rician

















where β0 represents the path loss at the reference distance of
1 meter, dBI denotes the distance from the BS to the IRS,
and αBI denotes the path-loss exponent. ĜL ∈ CN×M is
the deterministic line-of-sight (LoS) channel component, and
ĜR ∼ CN (0, I) denotes the scattering component. In addition,
KBI > 0 is the corresponding Rician factor.
Similarly, hr,k ∈ C1×N is the Rician channel fading vector
















where dk is the distance between the IRS and the kth user, αr,k
is the path-loss exponent, and ĝL ∈ C1×N and ĝR ∼ CN (0, I)
represent the deterministic LoS channel component and the
scattering component, respectively. KIU is the corresponding
Rician factor.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the channel gains
between the IRS and legitimate users satisfy
0 < ∥hr,1∥2 ≤ · · · ≤ ∥hr,K∥2 . (5)
Then, the transmit power from the BS satisfies∑
k∈K
∥wk∥2 + ∥wjam∥2 = Pmax, (6)
where Pmax denotes the maximum transmit power for BS.
For convenience, we define the IRS reflecting vector as
vH = [v1, v2, . . . , vN ], where vn = Φn,n = ejθn , ∀n. By
changing the variables, we have
hr,kΦHm = vHHmrk, (7)
where Hmrk = diag(hr,k)Hm. Therefore, the signal-to-






∣∣vHHmrkwi∣∣2 + ∣∣vHHmrkwjam∣∣2 + σ2
. (8)
In NOMA systems, each receiver utilizes SIC to eliminate
the multi-access interference. The SIC decoding order among
users is mainly determined by the channel quality. According-
ly, the user with a stronger channel gain should first decode
the messages from other users with weaker channels. However,
due to the IRS, the decoding order of SIC not only depends on
the transmit beamforming vectors {wk} but also on the IRS
reflecting vector {v}1. Let π(k) denotes the decoding order
of the kth user. Then, π(k) = m means that the message
for the kth user is the m-th signal to be decoded at the
receiver. According to the channel assumption in (5), we define
π(k) = k. Therefore, the following constraints in the proposed





∀l, i, j ∈ K, i > j, i ∈ I, l ∈ T ,
(9)
where I = {1, 2, . . . , k}, T = {k, k + 1, . . . ,K}.
To guarantee the secure transmission for legitimate users,
we assume that artificial jamming is generated together with
the NOMA signals at BS, which can suppress the reception
at the eavesdropper effectively. In order to avoid adverse
impact on legitimate receivers, we should make the received
jamming power highest at all receivers, which can be decoded
and eliminated in the first step of SIC. Thus, the decoding





∣∣vHHmrkwπ(j)∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣vHHmrkwjam∣∣2 ,
∀l, i, j ∈ K, i > j, i ∈ I, l ∈ T .
(10)
Accordingly, the jamming signal can be removed first, and






, k ∈ K, k ̸= K. (11)





Accordingly, the corresponding SINR for the lth user to
1The embedded IRS controller can communicate and receive the reconfigu-
ration request from the external BS with given wired or wireless connections.
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1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, l ∈ T .
(13)
In NOMA networks, the SINR for the lth user to decode
the kth signal should be no smaller than the target SINR of
the kth user, denoted as γtark , γ
k
l ≥ γtark [29], [30], in order
to successfully subtract the message of Uk from the received
signal at Ul. Then, the target SINR of Uk can be expressed as
γtark = min{γkk , γkk+1, . . . , γkK}. (14)
Thus, the corresponding rate for the kth user can be given by
Rk = log2(1 + γ
tar







In addition, the eavesdropping SINR towards the kth user







where Hmre = diag(hr,e)Hm and hr,e denotes the channel
vector between the IRS and the eavesdropper, which is un-
available for the legitimate network2. Thus, the secrecy rate








where [x]+ , max(x, 0). As the eavesdropping CSI is not
required by the legitimate network, the proposed scheme can
be also applied to the multi-eavesdropper scenario with similar
performance.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the optimization design of the
transmit beamforming, the artificial jamming vector and the
IRS reflecting vector. We aim to maximize the sum rate of
all users, subject to the QoS requirement, the IRS reflecting
constraint, the SIC decoding condition, and the transmit power










γkl ≥ rk, l ∈ T , (18b)
max
k∈K
∥wk∥2 ≤ ∥wjam∥2 , (18c)∑
k∈K
∥wk∥2 + ∥wjam∥2 = PS , (18d)
|vn| = 1, n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (18e)
(10). (18f)
2In this paper, the eavesdropping CSI is used to analyze the secure
performance of the proposed schemes in (16) and (17) via simulation results,
not for the design of the schemes.
The constraint (18b) ensures that the SINR for the lth user to
decode the kth message exceeds rk, l ∈ T , where rk denotes
the QoS requirement for the kth user. (18c) guarantees the
enough jamming power to disrupt the eavesdropping. (18d) is
the constraint of total transmit power at BS. The constraint
(18e) indicates that each IRS reflecting element only adjusts
the phase shift of incident signal and does not amplify its
amplitude. (18f) denotes the SIC decoding constraints.
Note that P0 is difficult to solve due to the non-convex
constraints as well as the coupled optimization variables.
To solve it, we transform the objective function (18) into
a more tractable form, i.e., introducing auxiliary variables
zk ∈ R+, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, which satisfy
1 + min
l










Nevertheless, the maximum value of the log(·) function in
(20) remains hard to obtain. Thus, we can turn to find its




zk, which is concave and also non-




zk as another constraint in the optimization










zk − 1 ≤ min
l
γkl , l ∈ T , (21c)
rk ≤ zk − 1, (21d)
max
k∈K
∥wk∥2 ≤ ∥wjam∥2 , (21e)∑
k∈K
∥wk∥2 + ∥wjam∥2 = PS , (21f)
|vn| = 1, n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (21g)
(10). (21h)
According to [31], (21b) can be expressed as a system of
second-order cone (SOC) constraints, which has no negative




zk, ξ ≥ 2, ξ ∈ K. (22)
Specifically, when ξ = K, we have z1,K = Z. Further-
more, involving the intermediate variables t1,ξ ∈ R+, ξ =
5










In addition, the hyperbolic constraint w2 ≤ xy (x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0)
can be converted into
∥∥∥[2w, x− y]H∥∥∥ ≤ x+ y. Based on the
similar conversion, (23) can be reformulated into a series of
SOC constraints as

∥∥∥[2z1,2, (z1 − z2)]H∥∥∥ ≤ z1 + z2,∥∥∥[2z1,3, (t1,2 − z3)]H∥∥∥ ≤ t1,2 + z3,
. . . . . .∥∥∥[2z1,ξ, (t1,ξ−1 − zξ)]H∥∥∥ ≤ t1,ξ−1 + zξ.
(24)







∥∥∥[2z1,ξ, (t1,ξ−1−zξ)]H∥∥∥≤ t1,ξ−1+zξ, (25b)
zk − 1 ≤ min
l
γkl , l ∈ T , (25c)
rk ≤ zk − 1, (25d)
max
k∈K
∥wk∥2 ≤ ∥wjam∥2 , (25e)∑
k∈K
∥wk∥2 + ∥wjam∥2 = PS , (25f)
|vn| = 1, n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (25g)
(10). (25h)
However, (25) is still non-convex and difficult to solve since
the transmit beamforming vectors wk, the artificial jamming
vector wjam and the IRS reflecting vector v are coupled.
We decompose the original problem into two subproblems
of transmit beamforming optimization and IRS reflecting op-
timization, which can be approximated as convex ones and
solved alternately in the next section.
IV. BEAMFORMING AND REFLECTING OPTIMIZATION
In this section, the optimization problem is decomposed
into two subproblems, which can be solved by alternately
optimizing the transmit beamforming vectors and IRS reflect-
ing vector. In addition, the convergence and computational
complexity of the proposed algorithm are also analyzed.
A. Beamforming Optimization







∥∥∥[2z1,ξ, (t1,ξ−1−zξ)]H∥∥∥≤ t1,ξ−1+zξ, (26b)
zk − 1 ≤ min
l
γkl , l ∈ T (26c)
rk ≤ zk − 1, (26d)
max
k∈K
∥wk∥2 ≤ ∥wjam∥2 , (26e)∑
k∈K
∥wk∥2 + ∥wjam∥2 = PS , (26f)
(10). (26g)
P2 is a non-convex problem mainly due to the non-convex
constraints (26c) and (10). Then, for the constraint (26c), it
can be changed into
SINRkk ≥ zk − 1,
SINRkk+1 ≥ zk − 1,
. . .
SINRkK ≥ zk − 1.
(27)




≥ zk − 1,
1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, l ∈ T .
(28)






However, it is still non-convex and difficult to solve. To
tackle this issue, we apply SCA to transform it and further
introduce the Taylor series approximation. For a differentiable
convex function f(x), it can be approximated by its tangential
function as g (x, x̄), where g (x, x̄) is the first order Taylor
expansion around x̄. Thus, we have
f(x)≥g (x, x̄)=f(x̄) +▽xf (x̄) (x−x̄) . (30)
When x = x̄, the equality holds.
Based on the above Taylor series approximation, Proposition
1 is presented to approximate (29).





The first order Taylor approximation to Q(wk, zk) around
(w̄k, z̄k) can be expressed as











(zk − 1)− σ2.
(32)
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In this way, Q(wk, zk) can be replaced by Q(wk, zk, w̄k, z̄k).













(zk−z̄k) , Q(wk, zk, w̄k, z̄k),
(33)
where

















[zk − 1− (z̄k − 1)] .
(34)
To match with the real characteristic of the function
Q(wk, zk), (34) can be further approximated as

































(zk − 1)− σ2.
(35)
The approximation in (33) holds when the conditions vk = v̄k
and zk = z̄k are satisfied.
From the above derivation, Q(vk, zk) can be approximated
as Q(vk, zk, v̄k, z̄k), and (31) can be transformed into a convex
one as (32).
Nevertheless, P2 is still non-convex due to (10), which can
be regarded as a series of inequalities as∣∣vHHmrkwi∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣vHHmrkwj∣∣2 , ∀i, j ∈ K, i > j. (36)
Note that the right sides of these inequalities are quadratic
functions of wj , which can be linearized using the following
proposition.
Proposition 2: Define a function as
F (wj) =
∣∣vHHmrkwj∣∣2 , j ∈ K. (37)
The first order Taylor approximation to F (wj) at a tangent
point w̄j can be expressed as
















In this way, (37) can be replaced by (38), and the constraint
(10) can be approximated as a convex one.
Proof: According to the Taylor series approximation, (37)
is a differentiable convex function, which satisfies
F (wj) ≥ F (w̄j) +▽F (w̄j)H(wj − w̄j). (39)
Substituting (37) into this inequality (39) based on the law of
derivation, we have





When w̄jw̄Hj ≽ 0 and vHHmrkH
H
mrkv ≽ 0, we can obtain
F (wj) , F (wj , w̄j) . (41)
From the above derivation, F (wj) can be approximated as
F (wj , w̄j).
Accordingly, we keep the real part of F (wj , w̄j), and all the
similar inequalities in (10) can be approximated into convex










which can be guaranteed when wj = w̄j holds.
Specifically, when wj = wjam, the right-hand side of (10)










Thus, (10) can be replaced by (42) and (43), which are
approximated as convex ones.














Using the above-mentioned approximations, P2 can be
formulated as (45) at the top of this page, which is a convex
problem and can be solved easily by the existing toolbox such
as CVX.
B. IRS Reflecting Optimization
For any given beamforming vectors w1 , w2, . . . , wK and





∥∥∥[2z1,ξ, (t1,ξ−1−zξ)]H∥∥∥≤ t1,ξ−1+zξ, (46b)
zk − 1 ≤ min
l
γkl , l ∈ T , (46c)
rk ≤ zk − 1, (46d)
|vn| = 1, n = 1, 2, . . . , N, (46e)
(10). (46f)
P3 cannot be solved directly due to the non-convex constraints





≥ zk − 1,







s.t. rk ≤ zk − 1, k ∈ K,∥∥∥[2z1,ξ, (t1,ξ−1 − zξ)]H∥∥∥ ≤ t1,ξ−1 + zξ, ξ ≥ 2, ξ ∈ K,{ ∥∥∥[2vHHmrlwk+1, . . . , 2vHHmrlwK , (Qk − 1)]H∥∥∥ ≤ Qk + 1, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 1,
















s.t. rk ≤ zk − 1, k ∈ K,∥∥∥[2z1,ξ, (t1,ξ−1 − zξ)]H∥∥∥≤ t1,ξ−1 + zξ, ξ ≥ 2, ξ ∈ K,{ ∥∥∥[2wHk+1HHmrlv, . . . , 2wHKHHmrlv, (Gk − 1)]H∥∥∥ ≤ Gk + 1, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 1,
0 ≤ GK , k = K, l ∈ T ,
0 ≤ |vn| ≤ 1, n = 1, 2, . . . , N,∣∣wHi HHmrkv∣∣2 ≤2Re(v̄HHHmrkwjwHj Hmrkv)−Re(v̄HHHmrkwjwHj Hmrkv̄) ,∀i, j ∈ K, i > j,∣∣wH1 HHmrkv∣∣2 ≤2Re(v̄HHHmrkwjamvHk Hmrkv)−Re(v̄HHHmrkwjamwHjamHmrkv̄) .
(60)
Under the given beamforming vectors wk and wjam, we can
conclude that∣∣vHHmrlwk∣∣2 = ∣∣(Hmrlwk)Hv∣∣2 = ∣∣wHk HHmrlv∣∣2 . (48)
Thus, (47) can be converted into∣∣wHk HHmrlv∣∣2
K∑
i=k+1
∣∣wHi HHmrlv∣∣2 + σ2
≥ zk − 1,
1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, l ∈ T .
(49)
Furthermore, it can be formulated as
K∑
i=k+1
∣∣wHi HHmrlv∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣wHk HHmrlv∣∣2zk − 1 − σ2. (50)
Similarly, due to the non-convexity of (50), we apply SCA via
Proposition 3 to transform it.





Then, according to the Taylor series approximation, it can be
approximated as














(zk − 1)− σ2.
(52)
In this way, G(v, zk) can be replaced by G(v, zk, v̄, z̄k).













(zk−z̄k) , G(v, zk, v̄, z̄k),
(53)
where


















[zk − 1− (z̄k − 1)] .
(54)
Then, it can be further expressed as














(zk − 1)− σ2 = (52).
(55)
The approximation in (53) holds with the conditions v = v̄
and zk = z̄k satisfied.
From the above derivation, G(v, zk) can be approximated
into G(v, zk, v̄, z̄k), and (51) can be transformed into a convex
one as (52).
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However, P3 is still non-convex due to (10). Following the




∣∣wHl HHmrkv∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣∣wHπ(i)HHmrkv∣∣∣2
≤
∣∣∣wHπ(j)HHmrkv∣∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣wHjamHHmrkv∣∣2 ,
∀l, i, j ∈ K, i > j, i ∈ I, l ∈ T .
(56)
For convenience, we consider (56) as a series of inequalities
as ∣∣wHi HHmrkv∣∣2 ≤ ∣∣wHj HHmrkv∣∣2 , i, j ∈ K, i > j. (57)
Accordingly, the inequalities in (57) can be transformed into









Sepcifically, when wj = wjam, the right-hand side of (56) can









As a result, all the non-convex constraints has been trans-
formed into convex ones, and P3 can be transformed into a
convex one as (60) at the top of next page and efficiently
solved via CVX.
C. Alternating Algorithm
In Section IV-A and Section IV-B, the original problem
(21) has been transformed and approximated into two convex
subproblems, i.e., (45) and (60). Next, we propose an iterative
algorithm based on alternating optimization to solve them,
which can be summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Alternating Algorithm for (21)
1: Randomly initialize the reflecting vector v(0) and the
transmit beamforming vectors w(0)k , k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, and
w(0)jam. Set the index of iteration t = 1.
2: Repeat




4: Using w(t+1)k and w
(t+1)
jam , solve (60) via CVX and obtain
the optimal value vt+1.
5: t = t+ 1.
6: Until |Z(t) − Z(t−1)| converges.





obtained in the (r + 1)th iteration by solving (45) is locally
optimal and the objective function is non-decreasing with iter-
ations. In the scheme, the objective function in (45) obtained
by Step 3 in Algorithm 1 is a lower bound to that of its original
problem (26). Similarly, the objective function in (60) is also
a lower bound to that of its original problem (46). Due to the
convexity of (45) and (60), each subproblem can be solved
to obtain a unique solution in each iteration. Furthermore, the
objective value of (60) is upper bounded by a finite value.
Therefore, Algorithm 1 can be guaranteed to converge to at
least a local optimal solution.
The initial reflecting vector v(0), the transmit beamforming
vectors w(0)k , k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, and w
(0)
jam in Algorithm 1 can
be generated as follows.
• IRS Reflecting Initialization: In the first step of Algo-
rithm 1, the phase shift of each element is arbitrarily
distributed between [0, 2π), while the reflecting amplitude
is always equal to 1.
• Transmit Beamforming Initialization: In order to guar-
antee that the artificial jamming can be eliminated in
the first step of SIC, the initial power allocation weight
of jamming vector w(0)jam can be set to
1
2 , and the
weights of beamforming vectors w(0)k , k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
are generated with 12(k+1) , which is helpful to satisfy the
constraints in (21).
After Algorithm 1, the phase shift on the combined incident




, θn ∈ [0, 2π), (61)
where Im(·) and Re(·) are the imaginary operator and the
real operator, respectively.
D. Computational Complexity Analysis
The main computational complexity of Algorithm 1 lies in
solving P2 and P3. According to [31], we can know that the
computational complexity for the second-order cone program-
ming (SOCP) is normally determined by the number of vari-
ables, constraints and its dimensions. To solve P2, the number
of constraints in (45) can be expressed as (1.5K2 + 3.5K).
Thus, the total number of iterations to reduce the duality gap to





The number of variables and dimensions for all constraints
in (45) are calculated as
(
K2 + 2K + 1 + 2(K + 1)M
)
and(
4K2 + 5K + (K + 1)M
)
, respectively. Therefore, the com-
















where TP2 denotes the number of iterations. Similarly, denot-
ing the number of iterations required for solving P3 by TP3,












Therefore, the overall complexity of solving (21) can be
expressed as (64) at the top of next page, where TAO is the
number of iterations required for Algorithm 1 to converge.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, simulation results are presented to show
the performance of the proposed artificial jamming assisted










K2 + 2K + 1 + 2(K + 1)M
)2 (












rk = 1, σ2 = −110 dBm and M = 4. The Rician factors
are KBI = KIU = 3 dB [23]. The BS and the IRS are set at
(5, 0, 0) and (0, 50, 20) in meters, respectively. The legitimate
users are arbitrarily distributed on the ground near the IRS,
i.e., in a circle region centered at (5, 50, 0) with the radius
of 5 meters, and the eavesdropper is located at (2, 50, 0). In
practical NOMA systems, the number of users to be served
should not be large to mitigate the imperfect SIC and reduce
the computational complexity. Thus, we set K = 2 or K = 3.
Furthermore, the scheme with random phase shift θ and the
scheme without jamming are presented as benchmarks.























Sum Rate (No jamming)
Transmission Rate of U3 (No jamming)
Transmission Rate of U2 (No jamming)
Transmission Rate of U1 (No jamming)
Sum Rate (Jamming)
Transmission Rate of U3 (Jamming)
Transmission Rate of U2 ( Jamming)
Transmission Rate of U1 (Jamming)
Fig. 2. The optimized transmission rate Rk and sum rate Rsum with
iterations for three users. M = 4, N = 30, rk = 1 and PS = 30 dBm.
As shown in Fig. 2, we first present the convergence of
Algorithm 1 for K = 3, N = 30, rk = 1 and PS = 30
dBm. From Fig. 2, we can observe that the proposed iterative
algorithm converges quickly, i.e., within 5 to 10 iterations,
which proves the stability and feasibility of Algorithm 1.
To discuss the relationship between the optimized transmit
power of users and the jamming power with different QoS
thresholds and different number of elements on the IRS, a two-
user case in the proposed IRS-NOMA scheme is first presented
in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. Fig. 3 shows the comparison on the
optimized Pjam and the allocated power of U2 with different
values of PS and rk. Set M = 4 and N = 30. From the
results, we can see that the optimized Pjam increases with PS .
Especially, when rk increases, the optimized jamming power
also increases, i.e., Pjam with rk = 8 is higher than Pjam
with rk = 1, while the allocated power P2 with rk = 8 is
much lower. This indicates that when PS is fixed, the far user
U1 should be allocated more power to satisfy the higher rk.
According to (18c), the jamming power should be higher than
the transmit power for users to be successfully eliminated via
SIC, which also results in higher Pjam. Thus, P1 and Pjam
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30













































Transmit Power of U2
Fig. 3. Optimized jamming power Pjam with different values of PS and
rk for two users. M = 4 and N = 30.
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Fig. 4. Optimized jamming power Pjam with different values of N and rk
for two users. M = 4.
increase while P2 decreases, giving a lower P2 when rk = 8
than when rk = 1.
In Fig. 4, we present the optimized jamming power Pjam
versus different values of N and rk for the two-user case
with PS = 25dBm and PS = 30dBm, respectively. From the
results, we can observe that Pjam increases slightly with the
growth of N , and the optimized Pjam with larger rk is always
higher than the Pjam with smaller rk, which is consistent
with the results in Fig. 3. It indicates that a larger number
of IRS elements provide a more configurable link, which can
reduce power consumption to satisfy the QoS requirement.
Thus, more power can be allocated to generate the jamming
signal.
For performance comparison, we consider a benchmark
scheme, i.e., the scheme with random phase shift θ, which
10
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Performance gain
Fig. 5. The optimized sum rate of the proposed scheme and the scheme with
random phase shift θ. M = 4, rk = 1 and PS = 30 dBm.
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70























Secrecy Rate of U3
Secrecy Rate of U2
Secrecy Rate of U1
Eavesdropping Rate of U3
Eavesdropping Rate of U2
Eavesdropping Rate of U1
Fig. 6. The optimized secrecy rate, sum secrecy rate and eavesdropping rate
with different N for three users. M = 4, rk = 1 and PS = 30 dBm.
shows the performance of the proposed IRS-NOMA scheme
by setting random phase shift θ at the IRS. From the results in
Fig. 5, we can observe that the sum rate in the two schemes
both increases with N , since more configurable links and a
higher array gain can be achieved with a lager number of IRS
elements. In addition, it is worth noticing that the performance
of the proposed scheme clearly outperforms the scheme with
random θ. Especially, when the number of N increases, the
gap between the proposed scheme and the random θ scheme is
gradually widening, which demonstrates the significant array
gain achieved by the transmit beamforming and IRS reflecting
optimization.
To further evaluate the performance of the proposed IRS-
NOMA scheme, we compare the secrecy rate, the sum secrecy
rate, and the eavesdropping rate for three users with different
number of elements on the IRS N in Fig. 6. From the results,
it can be observed that the sum secrecy rate of all users
increases with N , which is consistent with the results from
Fig. 5. In addition, the nearest user U3 has the highest secrecy
rate due to its best channel gain and lowest eavesdropping
rate. Accordingly, Fig. 7 presents the achievable rate versus
the number of antennas at the BS M for K = 3, N = 30,
3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7



























Secrecy Rate of U3
Secrecy Rate of U2
Secrecy Rate of U1
Eavesdropping Rate of U3
Eavesdropping Rate of U2
Eavesdropping Rate of U1
Fig. 7. The optimized secrecy rate, sum secrecy rate and eavesdropping rate
of the proposed scheme with different M for three users. N = 30, rk = 1
and PS = 30 dBm.
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Secrecy Rate of U3
Secrecy Rate of U2
Secrecy Rate of U1
Eavesdropping Rate of U3
Eavesdropping Rate of U2
Eavesdropping Rate of U1
Fig. 8. The optimized secrecy rate, sum secrecy rate and eavesdropping rate
of the proposed scheme with different PS for three users. M = 4, N = 30
and rk = 1.
rk = 1 and PS = 30 dBm. From Fig. 7, we can conclude that
the sum secrecy rate of all users increases with M as larger
beamforming gain can be achieved. In Fig. 8, we compare the
optimized secrecy rate, sum secrecy rate and eavesdropping
rate with different PS . K = 3, M = 4, N = 30 and
rk = 1. From Fig. 8, we can see that the sum secrecy rate
increases with PS . Specifically, the secrecy rate of U3 is the
highest, while the secrecy rate of U1 is the lowest, which
is reasonable given the predefined relationship of channel
gains. Nevertheless, the eavesdropping rate of U1 is still a
little higher, which can be further reduced by increasing the
proportion of artificial jamming in beamforming vectors.
In order to present the improvement of secrecy performance
with artificial jamming, we further compare the eavesdropping
rate, the transmission rate and the sum rate with PS = 20dBm
(i.e., Fig. 9(A)-(B)) and PS = 30dBm (i.e., Fig. 9(C)-(D)),
respectively. Furthermore, the scheme without jamming is used
as a benchmark. K = 3, M = 4, N = 30 and rk = 1. From
Fig. 9, we can see that the eavesdropping rate of all users












































































A: PS=20dBm B: PS=20dBm
C: PS=20dBm D: PS=20dBm
Fig. 9. Comparison on eavesdropping rate, secrecy rate and sum secrecy
rate of the proposed IRS-NOMA scheme and the scheme without jamming
with different PS . K = 3, M = 4, N = 30 and rk = 1.
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Sum Rate in IRS-OMA Scheme
Sum Secrecy Rate in IRS-NOMA Scheme
Sum Secrecy Rate in IRS-OMA Scheme
PS=30dBm
PS=20dBm
Fig. 10. The optimized sum rate and sum secrecy rate of the proposed IRS-
NOMA scheme and the IRS-OMA scheme with different values of N and
PS . K = 3, M = 4 and rk = 1.
compared to that of the scheme without jamming. Particularly,
the eavesdropping rate towards U1 is disrupted effectively. It
is worth noticing that U1 has the worst channel quality and
is most threatened by the potential eavesdropper, due to its
highest transmit power according to NOMA. On the other
hand, there is a little difference in the achievable transmission
rate between the proposed scheme and the scheme without
jamming. Especially when PS is lower, i.e., PS = 20 dBm in
Fig. 9(B), we can see that the achievable transmission rate
in the proposed scheme is decreased compared to that of
the scheme without jamming. However, this influence can be
prevented by increasing PS , as shown in Fig. 9(D), i.e., when
PS = 30 dBm, the achievable Rsum is only a little lower
compared with the benchmark scheme.
The comparison on the proposed IRS-assisted NOMA
scheme and the IRS-assisted OMA scheme is presented in
Fig. 10. In the IRS-assisted OMA scheme, the BS serves three
users through the frequency division multiple access, with
the unit bandwidth equally divided. Similar to the NOMA
scheme, the sum rate for the OMA users is maximized
by optimizing the transmit beamforming together with the
artificial jamming vector and the IRS reflecting vector, subject
to the QoS requirement and the transmit power constraint at
the BS. The artificial jamming can be zero-forced by the BS at
each legitimate receiver via beamforming without affecting the
legitimate transmission. As shown in Fig. 10, we can observe
that the IRS-assisted NOMA scheme significantly outperforms
the IRS-assisted OMA scheme, because the resource block
(e.g., bandwidth) in NOMA can be used to serve multiple
users simultaneously compared with the OMA scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed an IRS-assisted NOMA
scheme to achieve secrecy transmission via artificial jamming,
in the presence of a passive eavesdropper whose CSI is un-
available in the legitimate network. The sum rate is maximized
by optimizing the transmit beamforming together with the ar-
tificial jamming vector and the IRS reflecting vector. Through
the optimization, the jamming signal can be completely elim-
inated by SIC without affecting the legitimate transmission,
and the eavesdropping can be efficiently disrupted. Due to the
non-convexity, the optimization problem is first decomposed
into two subproblems of the beamforming optimization and
the IRS reflecting optimization. Then, each subproblem can be
converted into a convex one by applying the SCA. An efficient
algorithm based on alternating optimization is proposed to
solve them iteratively. Simulation results are presented to show
that significant secrecy performance gain can be achieved
by the proposed scheme compared with the scheme without
jamming and the IRS-assisted OMA scheme. In the future
work, we will continue to focus on the imperfect SIC and
active IRS for the proposed scheme.
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